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General deterrence and the balance of power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Lawrence Freedman
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Extract

The advent of nuclear weapons is clearly the single most important development which post-war balance of power thinking has had to accommodate. Although there have been earlier attempts to explore this relationship,1 an examination of the current debate on deterrence should throw some light on the issue of the continuing relevance of the balance of power concept.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 15 , Special Issue 2 , April 1989 , pp. 199 - 210
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1989

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References

1. See for example Snyder, G. H., ‘Balance of Power in the Missile Age’, Journal of International Affairs, xiv (1960), pp. 21–34Google Scholar; and ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, in Seabury, P. (ed.), Balance of Power (San Francisco, 1965), pp. 184–201Google Scholar.

2. Jervis, R., ‘Deterrence Theory Revisited’, World Politics, xxxi (1979), p. 289CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. George, A. and Smoke, R., Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974).Google Scholar

4. For a survey of the analytical literature on deterrence theory and practice and a full bibliography, see Lebow, R. N. and Stein, J. G., ‘Beyond Deterrence’, Journal of Social Issues, xliii (1987)Google Scholar. This edition of the journal is devoted to deterrence theory.

5. George and Smoke, op. cit., p. 11.

6. This distinction was first elaborated by Snyder, G. H. in his 1958 monograph Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton, NJ, Center of International Studies, 1958)Google Scholar. See also his Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ, 1961).Google Scholar

7. This is essentially the position taken by Lebow and Stein, op. cit.

8. The distinction between deterrence and compellence, i.e. between ‘inducing inaction and making someone perform’, has been most fully elaborated by Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn., 1966), p. 175Google Scholar, pp. 69ff.

9. For a discussion of this issue see S. Maxwell, ‘Rationality in Deterrence’, Adelphi Paper No. 50 (London, 1968).

10. Morgan, P., Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1977), p. 28Google Scholar, emphasis in original. A second edition was published in 1983, but the material on general deterrence remained unchanged; all page citations are from the first edition.

11. Ibid., p. 29.

12. Ibid., p. 30.

13. Ibid., p. 204. He reports that he only included the concept in a second draft of his book after colleagues had complained that his total concentration on immediate deterrence neglected the constancy in the US-Soviet relationship and the extent to which deterrence was required to work not only at the point when a Soviet attack was under active consideration but also to keep them from ever getting to this point.

14. Huth, P. and Russett, B., ‘Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation’, International Studies Quarterly, xxxii (1988), p. 30Google Scholar.

15. Lebow and Stein, op. cit., p. 8.

16. For example see Gaddis, J. L., The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York, 1987).Google Scholar

17. Morgan, op. cit., pp. 40–3. He outlines the characteristics of general deterrence as: (1) Relations between opponents are such that leaders in at least one would consider resorting to force if the opportunity arose. (2) The other side, precisely because it believes the opponent would be willing to consider resort to force, maintains forces of its own and offers warnings to respond in kind to attempts to use force contrary to its interests. (3) The decision makers at whom the general deterrent threat is aimed do not go beyond preliminary consideration of resorting to force because of the expectation that such a policy would result in a corresponding resort to force of some sort by leaders of the opposing state.

18. Lebow and Stein, op. cit., pp. 8, 29.

19. Morgan, op. cit., p. 43.

20. Ibid., p. 42.

21. Lebow, R. N., ‘Conventional vs Nuclear Deterrence: Are the Lessons Transferable?’ Journal of Social Issues, xliii (1987), p. 184Google Scholar.

22. Ibid., p. 188.

23. Jervis, R., Lebow, R. N., Stein, J. G., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md., 1985)Google Scholar along with the works by these authors cited earlier (n. 2 and n. 4) and those by George and Smoke (n. 3) and Huth and Russett (n. 14).

24. On problems with command and control see Bracken, P., The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons (New Haven, Conn., 1983).Google Scholar

25. Bundy, McGeorge, ‘The Bishops and the Bomb’, The New York Review (16 June 1983)Google Scholar. For a discussion see Freedman, L., ‘I Exist; Therefore I Deter’, International Security, xiii (1988), pp. 177–195CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26. For an elegant statement of this view see Bobbitt, P., Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy (London, 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27. Mueller, J., ‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World’, International Security, xiii (1988), pp. 55–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28. Mueller notes that ‘the vast majority of wars that never take place are caused by factors which have little to do with military considerations’ (ibid., p. 70), by which he means that the absence of such wars (the goal of general deterrence) may be due to non-military incentives and disincentives. But of course while military considerations inevitably loom larger in the outbreak of war they are still only one factor among many.